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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is in a particularly uncertain situation as to 
how to dispose of spent nuclear fuel, which is highly radioactive 
waste that is now being held at various facilities across the country.  
For over two decades, U.S. nuclear waste policy rested on the 
development of a long-term geologic burial site in Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada.  However, the Yucca Mountain waste management program 
was suspended indefinitely in 2010.  The United States is now “back 
to the drawing board” in the sense that it lacks a long-term solution 
for the safe disposal of nuclear waste. 
The agency responsible for licensing nuclear facilities, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), is now in a difficult 
position.  Recently, in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated two NRC rulings that 
enabled the agency to issue operating licenses to nuclear facilities.  
The court held that the NRC’s rulings improperly conclude that 
permanent storage of nuclear waste will become available “when 
necessary,” which is an insufficient evaluation under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 In response, the NRC 
announced a freeze on all licensing and renewals of licenses until it 
addresses the court’s ruling.  
This comment will explain why the federal nuclear waste 
management program is at a standstill and will suggest a course of 
action for the NRC to help revive the program.  Part II describes the 
environmental hazards of spent nuclear fuel and the federal 
government’s effort to site and build a geologic repository for this 
nuclear waste.  Part III explains the role of the NRC in the nuclear 
regulatory scheme and how safety and environmental regulations are 
promulgated and enforced.  Part IV narrows in on the NRC 
rulemakings called the “Waste Confidence Decision” and 
*Emily Casey is a third-year law student at Pepperdine University School 
of Law.  Her interest in this topic was sparked growing up in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
and listening to the debate surrounding the Yucca Mountain Repository Program.  
1 New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 
2012).
2 Id. at 478. 
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“Temporary Storage Rule,” and the reasons why they were defeated 
in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  In Part V, I propose 
that the NRC make significant changes to these “waste confidence” 
rulings to ensure compliance with NEPA.  
Political failures have demonstrated that the NRC can no 
longer presume the opening of a permanent geologic repository 
within a reasonable time frame.  In the absence of a repository, the 
NRC should amend the rulings to consider other interim options, 
namely consolidation of above-ground storage sites.  By 
incorporating these changes, the NRC will acknowledge the current 
reality of nuclear waste policy, promote practical strategies that are 
likely to be pursued given this reality, and thus offer a better 
environmental evaluation under NEPA. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
It may come as a surprise to learn that roughly twenty percent 
of the nation’s electricity is generated by nuclear energy.3 Nuclear 
power production has increased over the last decade,4 surpassing 
electricity generation from all other sources but coal, which produces 
roughly half of the electricity in the United States.5 Nuclear energy 
is a leading option for the future, namely because it is produced 
domestically, reduces national fossil fuel dependency, and is one of 
the least expensive forms of energy.6 Relative to other sources of 
3 BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT 
TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY 14 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter BRC REPORT], 
available at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120620220235/http://brc.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/documents/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.
4 See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY 
REVIEW 2011 273, Table 9.2 (Sept. 2012), available at
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.  Although no new nuclear 
power plants have begun construction since 1978, existing nuclear plants have 
increased capacity.  Id. Nuclear plants are now operating at an average of ninety 
percent capacity, whereas in the 1990s they were averaging seventy-five percent 
and in the 1980s they were averaging sixty percent.  Id.
5 Roger H. Bezdek, Nuclear Power Prospects in the USA: The Continuing 
Problem of the Waste Issue, 20 ENERGY & ENV’T 375, 375 (2009). 
6 Aaron Szabo, Reprocessing: The Future of Nuclear Waste, 29 TEMP. J.
SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 231, 233 (2010).  Nuclear energy is the lowest cost 
producer of baseload electricity per kilowatt-hour, costing an average of 2 cents per 
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electricity, nuclear energy generates drastically lower carbon 
emissions and other criteria pollutants.7 Regardless of the debates as 
to whether the commercial nuclear energy sector will or even should 
expand, the reality is that there are 104 nuclear reactors currently 
operating in the United States, and these reactors produce an 
aggregate total of 2,000 to 2,400 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel per 
year.8 Accumulation of nuclear waste remains a glaring concern.  
Safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel has proven to be both a scientific 
and political challenge.  The public must feel uneasy, if not seriously 
disturbed, at the status of nuclear waste policy in the United States, 
given that it currently has no long-term solution whatsoever for the 
disposal of highly radioactive nuclear waste.
kilowatt-hour.  Nuclear Energy: Just the Facts, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., 17 
(2010), 
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/reliableandaffordableenergy
/brochures/justthefacts.  Because only a quarter of its production costs are 
attributed to fuel costs, nuclear power is relatively unaffected by the price 
fluctuations that drive the costs of fossil-fuel energy, and thus nuclear power has 
remarkable forward price stability.  Id. 
7 Justin Gundlach, What’s the Cost of a New Nuclear Power Plant?  The 
Answer’s Gonna Cost You: A Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Cost of New 
Power Plants, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 605 (2010).  The nuclear lifecycle yields 
a small volume of greenhouse gases, close to that of wind power.  Id. (citing M.V. 
Ramana, Nuclear Power: Economic, Safety, Health, and Environmental Issues of 
Near-Term Technologies, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES, 127, 144 (2009)).  
In the year 2011, nuclear-generated electricity diverted 613 million metric tons of 
carbon dioxide.  This is roughly equivalent to the amount of carbon dioxide 
“released from 110 million cars, which is nearly all U.S. passenger cars.”  See
Environment: Emissions Prevented, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST.,
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/nuclear_statistics/environmentemissionspreve
nted/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
8 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.  Most nuclear power plants are fueled 
by enriched uranium oxide. Charles de Saillan, Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel in 
the United States and Europe: A Persistent Environmental Problem, 34 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 472 (2010).  The enriched uranium oxide is suspended in 
zirconium alloy tubes about three or four meters in length called fuel rods.  Id.
Several hundred fuel rods are bundled together to form assemblies within one 
reactor.  Id. As the reactor operates, the uranium-235 atoms are split into lighter 
elements.  Id. After three or four years, the concentration of uranium-235
decreases such that the nuclear reactor must be shut down and replaced with new 
fuel.  Id. These depleted fuel rod assemblies are referred to as “spent nuclear fuel.”  
Id.
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Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is composed of highly radioactive 
nuclear byproducts, some of which have half-lives spanning 
thousands of years.9 It also emits thermal heat, making it very 
dangerous to handle when it comes out of the reactor.10
Consequently, SNF is first kept in temporary storage to cool before it 
is moved to another site.11 Shortly after it is removed from the 
reactor, SNF is stored in on-site containment pools of circulating 
water.12 The water cools the SNF and defrays some of the 
radiation.13 After an average of five years in the pool, the SNF can 
be moved to another facility for further processing, temporary 
storage, or permanent disposal.14
In the absence of a permanent storage facility, nuclear 
facilities are compensating by keeping SNF at on-site storage units 
even after they have completed the cooling process.  Some plants 
have adopted dry cask storage, whereby SNF is inserted into a 
container made of concrete and steel, filled with inert gas, and bolted 
and welded shut.15 Dry cask storage is the safest and most preferred 
storage option, but also more expensive.16 In studies, the casks have 
persisted against airplane crashes, explosives, and rounds fired at the 
9 See de Saillan, supra note 8, at 472–73.  A “half-life” is the amount of 
time it takes for fifty percent of the atoms in a radioactive isotope to decay.  Id. at 
472 n.74.
10 Id. at 472.
11 Id. at 473.
12 Id. at 474.
13 Id.
14 “Disposal” and “storage” have different meanings in the context of 
nuclear waste.  Disposal is the final, long-term stage of waste management that 
relies “only on the passive operation of natural environmental and man-made 
barriers.”  BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at xi.  Disposal refers to geologic burial with 
the purpose of isolating the nuclear waste from human contact for tens of thousands 
of years.  See NEA Issue Brief: No. 3, The Disposal of High-Level Radioactive 
Waste, NEA (Jan. 1989), http://www.oecd-nea.org/brief/brief-03.html.  In contrast, 
“storage” is an interim period in waste management.  BRC REPORT, supra note 3,
at xi.  Storage involves managed access to the waste with “active human control 
and maintenance” so that the waste is still retrievable.  Id. Nuclear waste in storage 
is subject to later disposal.  Id.
15 de Saillan, supra note 8, at 474.
16 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 34.
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exterior armor.17 The casks are designed for dual purposes of interim 
storage and transport, although only a small percentage of SNF has 
been relocated to off-site facilities.  About 15,000 metric tons of 
commercial SNF have been converted to the dry cask storage form.18
The aggregate amount of SNF and high-level waste (HLW) in 
the United States is over 70,000 metric tons.19 Nearly all of the 
existing SNF is stored at the reactor sites where it was generated, 
including sites that have been shut down.20 About three-quarters of 
the SNF remains in its original cooling containment pools.21 Some 
nuclear reactors are now storing up to five times as much SNF in 
their containment pools as was initially subscribed by their operating 
licenses.22 Packing more SNF assemblies into these pools impairs 
the circulation of water and increases the risk of fire.23
A. Federal Administrative Responsibility of Nuclear Disposal
 
As a result of these pronounced dangers, nuclear development 
is highly regulated by the federal government.  The Energy 
Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974 established the regulatory system 
that closest resembles the structure in place today.24 The ERA of 
1974 eliminated the Atomic Energy Commission, which was once 
the sole, centralized agency for all nuclear development, and divided 
its functions into two new agencies.25 First, it designated the 
responsibility of licensing and regulation of commercial nuclear 
facilities to the NRC.26 The second agency, which ultimately 
evolved into the Department of Energy (DOE), was charged with 
17 Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a 
Bankrupt System, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 783, 805 (2010). 
18 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
19 Stewart, supra note 17, at 787.  High-level waste is spent nuclear fuel 
that has been reprocessed, but is still highly radioactive.  Id. at 786.  To put this in 
context, 70,000 metric tons of SNF and HLW would fill one football field to a 
height of over than 20 feet.  See BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. 
20 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
21 Id. 
22 de Saillan, supra note 8, at 478. 
23 Id.
24 Stewart, supra note 17, at 789. 
25 Id.
26 Id.
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development of nuclear weapons and promotion of nuclear energy.27
In short, the NRC holds regulatory power over civilian nuclear 
facilities, while the DOE operates defense nuclear facilities.28
In the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, Congress 
assumed responsibility for permanent disposal of SNF and HLW, and 
chose geologic burial as the method of disposal.29 The NWPA 
charged the DOE with the overall task of developing a permanent 
federal repository for commercial waste.30 To pay for the repository, 
the NWPA established the Nuclear Waste Fund, which collects fees 
calculated by the amount of kilowatts of electricity produced from 
commercial nuclear facilities.31 The NWPA created a Standard 
27 Id.
28 Id. 
29 Geologic burial was not always the clear choice for nuclear waste 
disposal.  In the initial stages, scientists suggested waste storage in remote and 
desolate areas, such as Antarctica or space.  Karen Breslin, Radio-Free America:
What to Do with the Waste, 102 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 832 (1994).  These 
options were abandoned due to exorbitant costs and the risk of catastrophic failure.  
Id. Another suggestion was burial deep within sediments in the seabed.  This, too, 
would be expensive, difficult to retrieve, and potentially violate international ocean 
dumping laws.  Id. Another alternative is long-term storage in above-ground units, 
allowing for more flexibility and easier retrieval.  Above-ground storage would rely 
on human institutions to control and monitor the waste for an indefinite period of 
time.  Id. at 833.  The United States is not considering this as a long-term strategy, 
although NGOs have proposed it.  Id. Geologic burial is the option currently in the 
lead in the United States and most nuclear countries.  See also Jane C.S. Long & 
Rodney C. Ewing, Yucca Mountain: Earth-Science Issues at a Geologic Repository 
for High-Level Nuclear Waste, 32 ANN. REV. OF EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 363, 
368 (2004).
30 42 U.S.C. § 10132(a) (2012).  The DOE currently operates a geologic 
repository for defense-generated transuranic radioactive waste called the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP).  D.D. TRENT, ET. AL., GEOLOGY AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 539 (6th ed. 2010).  WIPP is the nation’s first underground nuclear 
waste repository, located in Carlsbad, New Mexico, and has been operating 
successfully since 1999.  Id. WIPP is unrelated to the NWPA and its federal 
repository program for commercial nuclear waste. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (2012).  The fees yield approximately $750 million 
per year, and the total unspent balance of the Fund is $27 billion.  BRC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 72.  The Fund was created for the “sole purpose” of ensuring that
the repository program would not have to compete with other federal programs for 
funding.  Id. at xi.  However, subsequent congressional and executive actions have 
defeated this purpose and effectively rendered the Nuclear Waste Fund unavailable.  
Id. at 72–73.  Now, nuclear waste programs are paid through yearly appropriations 
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Contract that obligates the DOE to dispose of SNF and HLW in 
return for payment by nuclear utilities companies.  The Contract’s 
terms specified that the DOE shall take title to all commercial SNF 
and open a permanent repository by 1998.32 In addition to outlining 
a permanent repository program, the NWPA also authorized the DOE 
to research and design a site for “monitored retrievable storage” 
(MRS) where SNF could be stored for a longer term prior to burial.33
The NWPA sought to establish a fair process for selecting a 
repository location to prevent the perception that a particular state 
would have to bear the burden of the nation’s total nuclear waste.34
To further this purpose, Congress expressly limited the capacity of 
the first repository to hold only 70,000 metric tons of waste until a 
second repository opened.35
B.  Political and Technical Obstacles in Finding a Permanent 
Repository
Pursuant to the NWPA, the DOE published a set of 
guidelines, or site-suitability criteria, to be used to objectively 
evaluate potential sites.36 The site suitability factors included 
consideration of “hydrology, geophysics, seismic activity, . . . 
proximity to water supplies, proximity to populations, . . . proximity 
to sites where high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel is 
from the Treasury and “therefore subject to exactly the budget constraints and 
uncertainties that the Fund was created to avoid.”  Id. at xi. Thus, the U.S. 
government has incurred a significant liability to the nuclear utilities companies, 
while the appropriations process has “clearly proven to be a poor mechanism for 
financing a very long-term and complex effort.” Id. at 74; see also Stewart, supra
note 17, at 799.
32 Gundlach, supra note 7, at 646.  The 1998 deadline was not met.  As a 
result, seventy-eight lawsuits have commenced, some of which have settled, and 
others have resulted in judgments that found the DOE in “partial breach” of the 
Standard Contract.  BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 79.  The DOE predicts that the 
total damage awards to nuclear utilities companies could reach $20 billion even if 
the federal government were to begin accepting nuclear waste in 2020.  Id.
33 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 22. 
34 Id. at 20.  The Act originally called for the selection of two repository 
sites, with the assumption that one would be located in the east and the other in the 
west.  Id. at 20–21. 
35 Stewart, supra note 17, at 794. 
36 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
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generated or temporarily stored and the transportation and safety 
factors involved in moving such waste to a repository.”37 Despite its 
primarily scientific objective, the DOE faced social and political 
hurdles in attempting to nominate sites for nuclear waste storage.38
The DOE identified three potential sites for an MRS facility, all 
located in Tennessee, but met with harsh political opposition in the 
state.39 The DOE suggested nine sites for a permanent geologic 
repository, including sites in Texas, Utah, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Washington, and Nevada.40 Subsequently, in 1982 the DOE 
narrowed the list and submitted three sites to President Reagan as 
candidates for site characterization, ranking Yucca Mountain in Nye 
County, Nevada, first among them.41 In 1986, the Secretary of 
Energy announced that the DOE had suspended its efforts to look for 
a second geologic repository.42 Due to the NWPA’s climbing costs 
and unmet deadlines, Congress amended the Act in 1987 to cancel all 
ongoing research for a second repository program or MRS site, and 
instead specifically directed the licensing and development of a 
single repository at Yucca Mountain.43
Yucca Mountain is one of the most extensively studied cases 
for nuclear waste disposal, with federal investment totaling 
approximately fifteen billion dollars.44 The DOE performed 
37 42 U.S.C. § 10132(a) (2012).  The DOE’s final site sustainability rules 
required that “engineered barriers shall not be used to compensate for an 
inadequate site; mask the innate deficiencies of a site; disguise the strengths and 
weaknesses of a site . . . and mask differences between sites when they are 
compared.”  10 C.F.R. § 960.3-1-5 (1984).  Thus, the goal of this process was to 
locate a site with sound natural geologic barriers rather than creating one artificially 
through a massive engineering feat.
38 Stewart, supra note 17, at 795.
39 Id. at 798. 
40 Id. at 795. 
41 Id. The DOE also recommended the Hanford site in Washington and a 
site in Deaf Smith County, Texas.  Id. at 795.
42 Id. at 796 n.35. 
43 Id. at 795.  The decision was criticized for its political implications.  It 
produced strong opposition in Nevada, a state with no commercial nuclear 
facilities, and came to be known as the “Screw Nevada” bill.  BRC REPORT, supra
note 3, at 22. 
44 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, G.A.O. 11-229, COMMERCIAL 
NUCLEAR WASTE: EFFECTS OF A TERMINATION OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN 
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thorough site characterization studies throughout the 1990s and
published an official finding of the site’s suitability in 2002.45 Yucca 
Mountain has several ideal characteristics: a very arid climate, layers 
of volcanic tuff that further reduce moisture, and rock beds that 
contain minerals called zeolites that slowly absorb radionuclides.46
The DOE intensively studied the groundwater paths in Yucca 
Mountain, and estimated that any flow of radioactive material would 
be minimal and at a very slow rate.47 However, local opposition to 
the project remained high, especially as other technical problems 
with the site were pointed out.48 The state of Nevada submitted a 
“Notice of Disapproval,” essentially a veto, provided under the 
NWPA.49 However, in 2002, Congress issued a resolution to 
REPOSITORY PROGRAM AND LESSONS LEARNED 27 (2011) [hereinafter G.A.O. 11-
229]. 
45 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23. 
46 David Applegate, The Mountain Matters, in UNCERTAINTY 
UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION’S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR 
WASTE, 105, 105 (Alison Macfarlane & Rodney Ewing eds., 2006). 
47 U.S. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, YUCCA MOUNTAIN:
THE MOST STUDIED REAL ESTATE ON THE PLANET 16–17 (2006), available at
http://www.epw.senate.gov/repwhitepapers/YuccaMountainEPWReport.pdf.  
Geology is a complex field that applies multiple disciplines over vast time frames, 
often introducing more questions than answers.  For a comprehensive summary of 
the geoscience issues related to the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a nuclear 
waste repository, see Long & Ewing, supra note 29. See also DEP’T OF ENERGY,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY FOR 
THE DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NYE COUNTY, NEVADA, DOE/EIS-0250 (2002). 
48 See Marta Adams, Yucca Mountain—Nevada’s Perspective, 46 IDAHO 
L. REV. 423, 423-29 (2010). Scientists advanced three primary reasons why Yucca 
Mountain would never be suitable for a permanent repository.  First, they contend 
that porous volcanic tuff is not ideal for nuclear waste storage, as it may release 
carbon-14, a radioactive gas, from the spent fuel into the air.  See generally Ning 
Lu & Benjamin Ross, Simulation of Gas Phase Transport of Carbon-14 at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada, USA, 14 WASTE MANAGEMENT, 409 (1994). Second, they 
express concern that moisture will corrode the containers because the repository is 
positioned above a water table, relatively shallow, and subject to high temperatures.  
See Adams, supra note 48, at 425.  Third, the Yucca Mountain site is seismically 
active and prone to earthquakes.  Id; see also State of Nevada Petition to Intervene, 
In the Matter of U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. 
63-001-HLW, available at 
http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/licensing/Contentions_NV.pdf. 
49 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23. 
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override the state’s veto, which President George W. Bush signed, 
allowing the DOE to proceed with the license application.50 In 2008, 
the DOE submitted the first license application to the NRC to 
construct the Yucca Mountain repository.51
Despite over twenty years of effort dedicated exclusively to 
this site, the Yucca Mountain Repository Program was suspended 
indefinitely in 2010.52 Under instructions from President Obama, the 
Secretary of Energy filed a motion to withdraw its license application 
in March 2010.53 While Yucca Mountain notably endured local 
opposition over several decades, crucially, the project was subject to 
yearly congressional appropriations.54 Facing a projected final cost 
of $76 billion,55 the DOE announced in the fiscal year of 2010 that 
“all funding for development of the Yucca Mountain facility has been 
eliminated, such as further land acquisition, transportation access, 
and additional engineering.”56 The administration stated that its 
decision to terminate the program was for policy reasons, and did not 
cite any safety or technical reasons.57 The 2012 Blue Ribbon 
50 Id. However, the battle did not end there.  With no authority in the 
“political decision making process,” Nevada has effectively delayed the project 
through legal means. Stewart, supra note 17, at 797.  The State of Nevada and 
various environmental groups have legally challenged the regulatory standards 
issued by the DOE, NRC, and EPA for the Yucca facility, resulting in some partial 
victories.  Id. 
51 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23. 
52 Lisa Mascaro, Feds File Request for Suspension of Yucca Mountain 
License, LAS VEGAS SUN (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/feb/01/feds-move-withdraw-yucca-
mountain-license-applicat/.
53 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MOTION TO WITHDRAW, ASLBP No. 09-
892-HLW-CAB04 (Mar. 3, 2010).
54 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, TERMINATIONS, REDUCTIONS, AND 
SAVINGS: BUDGET OF THE U.S. FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 68 (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2010-TRS/pdf/BUDGET-2010-TRS.pdf; 
see also supra note 31 and accompanying text regarding the Nuclear Waste Fund.
55 DEPT. OF ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE COST 
OF THE CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, Fiscal Year 
2007, No. RW-0591 (2008).
56 Richard M. Jones, FY 2010 Energy & Water Development 
Appropriations Bill: Nuclear Waste, Number 119, FYI: The AIP Bulletin of 
Science Policy News, AM. INST. OF PHYSICS.  Oct. 6, 2009, 
http://www.aip.org/fyi/2009/119.html.
57 G.A.O. 11-229, supra note 44, at 11.
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Commission Report to the Secretary of Energy concluded that the 
failure of Yucca Mountain was rooted in political inadequacies—
namely the NWPA’s rigid “prescriptiveness” and non-consensual site 
selection process.58
Much ink has been spilled regarding Yucca Mountain’s 
suitability as a nuclear waste repository and whether the project 
should be revived.59 Nonetheless, the Yucca Mountain repository 
will not be completed for years to come,60 if ever, and the nuclear 
waste on hand already exceeds Yucca Mountain’s authorized 
capacity.61 The failure of the Yucca Mountain repository program 
demonstrates that the United States is at an impasse with regard to 
nuclear waste disposal.  Absent renewed financial support and major 
revisions to the NWPA, over 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste will 
continue to reside in thirty-five states and seventy-five different 
reactor sites, ten of which are shut down.62 Concerns about long-
58 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23 (“The State of Nevada was not asked 
for, and did not provide, consent for the site to be selected for investigation.  On the 
contrary, the state and a majority of its citizens strongly opposed the selection of 
Yucca Mountain as a repository site . . . .”).
59 See generally Applegate, supra note 46, at 105; Adams, supra note 48;
Karoun Demirjian, Yucca Mountain Debate Returns to Capitol Hill, LAS VEGAS 
SUN (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/aug/02/yucca-
mountain-debate-returns-capitol-hill/; Brian Wingfield, Yucca Nuclear Debate 
Seen Revived as Court Rebuffs NRC, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-14/yucca-nuclear-debate-seen-revived-
as-court-rebuffs-nrc.html.
60 Under the NWPA, the NRC is obligated to issue a decision regarding 
Yucca Mountain within three years of the DOE’s license submission.  42 U.S.C. § 
10134(d) (2006).  Thus, the NRC’s licensing decision was due in June 2011.  In 
August 2013, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted a Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus against the NRC for violating the NWPA’s statutory mandate for its 
failure to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process.  In re Aiken Cty., 725 
F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  Although the NRC argued that the licensing proceeding 
should not continue because the project lacked Congressional appropriations, the 
Court held that the NRC is currently “flouting the law” and the agency is legally 
obligated to resume licensing proceedings with the funds that are currently 
available to it.  Id. at 5–7. 
61 See supra Part IIA–B.
62 Rodney Ewing & Frank von Hippel, Nuclear Waste Management in the 
United States—Starting Over, 325 SCIENCE 151, 151 (2009). 
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term security, health, and safety are at an all-time high, while trust 
and confidence in U.S. nuclear waste policy is at an all-time low.63
III. THE NUCLEAR LICENSING PROCESS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
LICENSING DECISIONS
Despite the close of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program, 
commercial nuclear power plants have continued their daily 
operations.  The DOE will eventually need to address the status of 
the federal repository program as part of its obligations under the 
NWPA.  In the meantime, though, the NRC continues to regulate 
commercial nuclear operations in the United States.  A key task of 
the NRC is to review applications and issue or renew operating 
licenses to nuclear power plants.64
The majority of today’s nuclear power plants were licensed 
during the 1960s and 1970s, and thus subject to a different licensing 
process.65 Under the old licensing procedure, nuclear power plants 
were granted a construction permit based on an initial design or 
blueprint.66 Safety and environmental concerns were addressed after 
the permit was issued and usually were not resolved until close to the 
completion of the site.67 The public would not have access to the 
details of the design until the plant was almost fully constructed.68 In 
1989, the NRC updated the licensing procedure to ensure that safety 
and regulatory concerns were addressed at an earlier stage and to 
open up the process for public involvement.69 Under the new rules, 
the complete process is estimated to take ten years, including siting, 
approval, construction, and development.70 No nuclear developer has 
63 See generally BRC Report, supra note 3.
64 About NRC, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html.
65 Licensing New Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (Oct. 
2010), 
http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/Licensing_New_Nuclear_Power
_Plants_October_2010.pdf?ext=.pdf.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id; see also 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.15–.27 (2012). 
70 Gundlach, supra note 7, at 626. 
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yet completed the entire licensing process under the post-1989 
rules.71
A.  Current Licensing Procedure for Commercial Nuclear Reactors
Under 10 C.F.R. § 52, the nuclear licensing process is divided 
into three overarching phases.  First, the developer submits an 
application for an Early Site Permit (ESP), which is normally drafted 
and approved within thirty months.72 The ESP is valid for twenty 
years, during which time the developer may take foundational steps 
for construction of a nuclear reactor on the property.73 The NRC has 
issued four ESPs thus far, with the process ranging from thirty-six to 
sixty months.74 This could include surveys and investigation to 
determine the best way “to link a massive new source of electricity to 
the transmission grid” as well as making physical modifications to 
the site.75 In the second phase, the developer submits a proposed 
nuclear reactor design to obtain a Standard Design Certificate (SDC) 
from the NRC.76 The NRC invites public participation to determine 
whether the reactor design is safe by utilizing a notice-and-comment 
process.77 Ultimately, the NRC issues a rule that outlines the 
71 Id.
72 Id. at 627. 
73 Id. 
74 Early Site Permit Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp.html. 
75 Gundlach, supra note 7, at 627.
76 Id. at 627–28. 
77 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.51–.63 (2012).  All proposed design certificate 
rulemakings are published in the Federal Register to give the public an opportunity 
to submit comments to the NRC.  Id. At its discretion, the NRC may call 
legislative hearings during this time.  Id. After public comments have been 
collected, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards issues a report to the 
NRC, and the NRC may render a final decision on the design certification.  Id.  The 
total process, from the submission of an application to the promulgation of a rule 
that describes the safety parameters of the reactor design, spans three years at 
minimum.  Gundlach, supra note 7, at 628.  Notice and comment procedures are 
used throughout the NRC.  Any member of the public may petition the NRC to 
develop a rulemaking or even modify an existing one.  See, e.g., The Rulemaking 
Petition Process, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/petition-rule.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
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requirements of the approved reactor design.78 The SDC is valid for 
ten to fifteen years, with the ability to renew for a second term.79
The NRC has certified four designs under this procedure.80 In the 
third and final phase, the developer applies for a Combined 
Construction & Operating License (COL) from the NRC.81 The COL 
authorizes the developer to actually construct the proposed reactor.82
Developers must overcome extreme financial obstacles in the private 
sector—to the tune of $10 billion—in order to begin construction of a 
nuclear facility.83 Therefore, the NRC reviews each COL application 
for the developer’s qualifications and operational programs, and 
verifies construction under inspections, tests, analyses, and 
acceptance criteria before issuing a COL.84 Although eighteen power 
plants have submitted applications for twenty-eight new reactors, no 
COL has been issued to date.85 A complete COL approval is 
predicted to take twenty-four to forty months for approval.86 The 
COL is valid for forty years from the date of issuance, and can be 
renewed for another twenty years.87
In addition to regulating the construction of a nuclear reactor, 
the NRC also regulates the storage of SNF through its licensing 
process.  Storage of SNF at the same active reactor site is covered by 
78 Gundlach, supra note 7, at 628. 
79 10 C.F.R. § 52.55.
80 Gundlach, supra note 7, at 628. 
81 Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last visited Mar. 10, 
2013). 
82 Id.
83 See Gundlach, supra note 7 (explaining that nuclear energy developers 
face uncertainties in the form of technological designs, licensing, engineering and 
fuel costs, severe construction delays, high insurance rates, and reactor lifespan and 
decommissioning costs).  “In addition to developing the reactor itself, a developer 
must also plan for: (1) how to integrate that new reactor into the electricity 
transmission grid; (2) who will staff the plant and operate the reactor; and (3) how 
much it will cost to acquire fuel and manage the radioactive waste left behind . . . .”
Id. at 629–30.
84 Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N, supra note 81.
85 Id.
86 Gundlach, supra note 7, at 629. 
87 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2012). 
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its general operating license.88 Therefore, a facility does not have to 
apply for a separate license to store SNF in its containment pools.  
However, if the facility decides to rearrange the assemblies within 
the pool to increase its capacity, the license must be amended to 
reflect this change.89 Likewise, dry cask storage located on an active 
reactor site is covered by the plant’s general operating license.90 The 
facility must notify the NRC and obtain certification for the design of 
the cask.91 General licenses authorizing storage of SNF are valid for 
forty years from the date issued, but can be renewed for another 
twenty years.92 Storage of SNF at an off-site location requires a site-
specific license obtained under a different process.93 A site-specific 
license for an independent spent fuel storage installation is valid for 
twenty years with an option for renewal.94
B.  NEPA: Addressing Safety and Environmental Concerns in the 
Licensing Process
Nuclear development and waste storage raise a host of safety 
and environmental concerns that play a major role in the NRC’s 
regulatory function.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) was formed in 1970 as the agency charged with enforcing 
environmental regulations under an array of federal laws.95 For 
instance, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act specifically authorizes the 
EPA to establish standards that apply to both DOE-operated and 
NRC-licensed facilities to protect the public from radioactive 
material.96 In addition to EPA standards, NEPA established 
88 See 10 C.F.R. § 72.212 (2012).
89 de Saillan, supra note 8, at 475 (citing Lower Alloways Creek Twp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
90 10 C.F.R. § 72.210. 
91 See 10 C.F.R. § 72.212(b). 
92 See Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REG. COMM’N, supra note 81; see also 10 C.F.R. § 72.42. 
93 Spent Fuel Storage Licensing, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/licensing.html (last visited Mar. 10, 
2013). 
94 Id.
95 See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15, 623 (Dec. 2, 
1970). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 10141(a) (2012).
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procedural requirements for all federal government agencies to 
evaluate possible environmental effects of future federal agency 
actions.97 Thus, the NRC has a dual responsibility to ensure 
compliance with EPA standards and to conduct environmental 
evaluations pursuant to NEPA.
NEPA is implicated when a federal agency proposes a “major 
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”98 Under NEPA, the agency must prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or, alternatively, conduct an 
environmental assessment (EA) and make a Finding of No 
Significant Environmental Impact (FONSI).99 An EIS or FONSI can 
be challenged in court on procedural or substantive grounds.  
However, NEPA is an “essentially procedural” statute because it 
requires the agency to research and report on the full range of 
environmental consequences with the intent of producing “fully 
informed and well-considered” decisions, but it does not mandate 
that an agency choose the most environmentally protective 
decision.100
It is well established that the granting of a nuclear reactor 
license is a major federal action affecting the quality of the human 
environment.101 Specifically, the issuance of an ESP implicates 
NEPA and requires the submission of an EIS to detail “the siting’s 
effects on the human environment.”102 Likewise, the issuance of a 
COL implicates NEPA and requires the submission of an EIS.  The 
NRC estimates that the entire environmental review process—
including scoping, issuance of the draft EIS, the notice and comment 
period, revisions, and issuance of the final EIS—spans two years.103
NEPA documents are subject to judicial review and often stimulate
97 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012). 
98 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
99 Id.
100 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 435 
U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
101 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (2012); see also New York v. Nuclear Reg. 
Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 2009).
102 Gundlach, supra note 7, at 627. 
103 See Regulations, Guidance, and Communications for New Reactors,
U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/regs-
guides-comm.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
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litigation, particularly when the stakes involve burial of nuclear 
waste. 
C.  How Courts Enforce NEPA in Nuclear Licensing Decisions
The legal significance of NEPA and its future impact on the 
NRC was first set forth in Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,104 shortly after enactment of the 
new statute.  NEPA was enacted prior to the formation of the NRC, 
so the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was the first agency to 
promulgate rules to conform its licensing proceedings to NEPA.105
The suit arose when local residents challenged the licensing of the 
Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant in Chesapeake Bay, Maryland, and 
appealed the AEC’s new rule statements.106 Although it was initially 
uncertain whether NEPA would actually affect federal decisions, the 
court held that NEPA was to be “rigorously enforced by reviewing 
courts.”107 The court rejected the AEC rule that limited the agency’s 
consideration of environmental issues to those that were affirmatively 
raised at a hearing.108 Rather, the court held that an agency must 
conduct an independent review, even where no party challenges a 
conclusion, in order to create a “detailed statement” that evaluates all
environmental concerns.109 Judge Wright explained,
NEPA establishes environmental protection as an 
integral part of the [Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s] basic mandate. The primary 
responsibility for fulfilling that mandate lies with the 
Commission.  Its responsibility is not simply to sit 
back, like an umpire, and resolve adversary 
contentions at the hearing stage.  Rather, it must itself 
104 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
105 David Repka & Tyson Smith, A Dose of History: Nuclear Energy 
Cases that Shaped Environmental Law, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 28, 28 
(2010).
106 Id.
107 Id. (quoting Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1114). Skelly Wright, the D.C. 
Circuit judge who wrote the opinion, was widely known as one of the more liberal 
judges from the civil rights era.  Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 28.
108 See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1118–19. 
109 Id.
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take the initiative of considering environmental values 
at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the 
process . . . .110
While Calvert Cliffs issued a clear mandate for federal 
agencies to initiate comprehensive environmental reviews under 
NEPA, agencies differed in their procedural approaches to carrying 
out this mandate.  All agencies were required to assess the impacts 
and risks of major federal actions under NEPA, but precisely how
they conducted these assessments and arrived at their conclusions 
was open to court scrutiny.111 This was largely true until 1978, when 
the Supreme Court delivered the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council decision, and severely 
limited the ability of the courts to proscribe agency procedure.112
Although Vermont Yankee had a broad application on 
administrative law as a whole, the case coincidentally arose from a 
nuclear licensing dispute.113 Because the AEC faced several 
challenges of the licensing of individual power plants, it opted to 
issue one rule to “generically address[]” the recurring environmental 
issues associated with the uranium fuel cycle.114 The AEC 
promulgated the so-called “fuel cycle rule” using an informal notice-
and-comment procedure that complied with the basic requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).115 On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit struck down the fuel cycle rule because of “perceived 
inadequacies” of the AEC’s rulemaking procedure.116 The Supreme 
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in a powerful “rebuke to 
110 Id. at 1119.
111 See Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29. 
112 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
113 Id. at 527.  The dispute concerned the NRC’s decision to grant a 
construction license to a Vermont power plant.  Id. The NRDC and local residents 
challenged the procedural rights afforded to individuals in the AEC’s licensing 
process.  Id. at 527–28.
114 Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29. 
115 Id. 
116 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 541.  Specifically, the D.C. Circuit found that 
the AEC’s decision not to allow discovery or cross-examination of agency 
personnel rendered the procedure inadequate because it deprived the challengers of 
a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings as a matter of due 
process.  Id. 
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what it considered judicial activism of the day,”117 holding that courts 
must exercise deference to agency procedures.  So long as the AEC 
rulemaking procedure did not violate the “statutory minima” (the 
requirements of the APA and NEPA), there was no other basis for the 
court to invalidate the AEC’s procedure.118 Absent constitutional 
restraints or extremely rare circumstances, administrative agencies 
“should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue 
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their 
multitudinous duties.”119 Thus, Vermont Yankee severely curtailed 
judicial review of agency rulemaking procedures and engendered a 
certain deference to the unique duties and expertise of administrative 
agencies. 
The practical effect of Vermont Yankee, then, makes it almost 
impossible for reviewing courts to impose additional procedural 
requirements upon the NRC.  However, the NRC may grant, and has 
granted, additional procedural rights at its own discretion.  The 
scoping and comment process under NEPA does not normally call 
for an administrative hearing.120 The NRC takes an exceptional step 
beyond the requirements of NEPA by offering a full hearing 
opportunity.121 Following the NEPA review, the NRC provides an 
opportunity for all “interested persons” to participate in hearings to 
consider any environmental issues related to a proposed project.122
The high degree of public participation in the licensing process, 
combined with the technical sophistication of the NRC as a whole, 
usually results in very detailed and comprehensive environmental 
impact statements.123
117 Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29. 
118 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548.
119 Id. at 543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)).
120 Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29. 
121 Id.
122 Id.  “Importantly, the standard of review for NRC hearings on 
environmental issues is not skewed in favor of the agency . . . . [F]or an applicant 
to prevail on a factual issue in the NRC hearing process, its position must be 
supported by the preponderance of the evidence.”  Id.
123 Id.  “The NRC has an enviable record in defending its NEPA 
documents on judicial review.”  Id.
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D.  Highly Deferential Review of Agency Scientific Determinations
The Supreme Court reinforced its deferential position toward 
agency expertise in Baltimore Gas & Electric v. National Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.124 In this case, the Court considered whether 
an NRC generic rule, the “permanent storage rule,” complied with 
NEPA.125 Generic rules, like the “fuel cycle rule” in Vermont 
Yankee, are settled regulations that an agency relies upon as a base 
assumption in future agency decisions.126 The NRC developed the 
permanent storage rule to allow future licensing boards to assume, 
for the purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage of certain 
nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact 
(called the “zero release assumption”).127 The NRC came to this 
conclusion based on “tentative but favorable” evidence that an 
appropriate repository site would be found to support the zero-release 
assumption.128 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the rule, 
finding that it violated NEPA because it prevented future licensing 
boards from considering uncertainties regarding emissions of HLW 
in long-term storage.129 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, 
124 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
125 Id. at 87.
126 Id. at 95.
127 Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29.  
128 Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 94.  The Court summarized the NRC’s 
conclusion: 
[The NRC] acknowledged that this assumption was uncertain 
because of the remote possibility that water might enter the 
repository, dissolve the radioactive materials, and transport them 
into the biosphere.  Nevertheless, the Commission predicted that 
a bedded-salt repository would maintain its integrity, and found 
the evidence ‘tentative but favorable’ that an appropriate site 
would be found.  
Id. The Court acknowledged that the NRC carefully considered and disclosed all 
relevant uncertainties as required by NEPA and properly concluded that these 
uncertainties were “not sufficient to affect the outcome of any individual licensing 
decision.”  Id. at 97–98. 
129 Id. at 96.  The heart of the dispute was the values within Table S-3, a 
numerical table adopted in the NRC regulations that estimated the emissions 
generated by one year of fuel cycle activities from the average commercial reactor.  
Id. at 91.
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upholding the NRC’s permanent storage rule as the result of a proper 
evaluation under NEPA and the APA.130
From the outset, the Court maintained that generic rules are 
necessary and “clearly appropriate” under NEPA because they
further administrative efficiency, consistency of decision, and 
prevent “needless repetition of litigation.”131 The importance of 
Baltimore Gas & Electric, however, is the degree of deference that 
the Court extends to agency decisions.  Justice O’Connor reminded 
reviewing courts: 
The [NRC] is making predictions, within its area of 
special expertise, at the frontiers of science. . . .  It is 
not our task to determine what decision we, as 
Commissioners, would have reached.  Our only task is 
to determine whether the Commission has considered 
the relevant factors and articulated a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.”132
The Court stressed that judicial inquiry into scientific or technical 
determinations requires the highest level of deference.133 The NRC’s 
permanent storage rule could only be rejected upon a finding that the 
NRC “acted arbitrarily or capriciously” in forming its decision, a 
violation of section 10(e) of the APA.134 Thus, Baltimore Gas & 
Electric limited judicial inquiry of agency decisions to whether the 
agency complied with the procedural requirements of the controlling 
statutes, NEPA and the APA.135 The extreme judicial deference to 
expert agencies advanced in Baltimore Gas & Electric is a basic 
foundation of administrative law.136
130 Id. at 108. 
131 Id. at 101. 
132 Id. at 103–05. 
133 Id. at 103. 
134 Id. at 87. 
135 Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 30. 
136 Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 87; see, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding courts must defer to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of statutory authority where the intent of 
Congress is ambiguous and the interpretation is reasonable or permissible); N.J. 
Envtl. Fed’n v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 645 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding 
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IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS VACATES THE NRC
WASTE CONFIDENCE DECISION
Although the Supreme Court yielded to the expertise of the 
NRC in Baltimore Gas & Electric, states and private interest groups 
continue to call on the courts to review certain NRC decisions.137
One NRC rule in particular, called the Waste Confidence Decision 
(WCD), has been the center of litigation and scientific controversy 
for nearly three decades.138 The WCD is a generic rule published in 
1984 and amended several times, recently culminating in a lawsuit in 
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held 
that the WCD stood in violation of NEPA.139 In August of 2012, 
shortly after this judgment, the NRC issued an indefinite freeze on all 
licensing proceedings.140
A.  The Development of the Waste Confidence Decision
The NRC originally issued the WCD in response to the 
judgment in Minnesota v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.141 In this 
case, the D.C. Circuit remanded two licensing actions that allowed 
NRC did not abuse its discretion by rejecting challenge of ultrasonic testing 
monitoring frequency at nuclear plant); Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. Salazar, 606 
F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service did not 
arbitrarily designate critical habitat for Mexican spotted owl under Endangered 
Species Act); BCCA Appeal Group v. U.S. EPA, 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding EPA’s approval of state plan for zone attainment was not arbitrary or 
capricious); Bark v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Or. 
2009) (holding Bureau’s environmental assessment of logging project satisfied 
requirements of NEPA and was not arbitrary or capricious); Nat’l Home Equity 
Mortg. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 271 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(holding OTS permissibly construed statute as allowing it to identify which 
regulations apply to state creditors). 
137 See Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 32. 
138 CTR. FOR NUCLEAR WASTE REG. ANALYSES, SUMMARY REPORT: THE 
STATE OF KNOWLEDGE OF WASTE CONFIDENCE, 1–5 (1988), available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0333/ML033371006.pdf.
139 New York v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
140 NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, MEMORANDUM & ORDER TO SUSPEND FINAL 
DECISIONS IN ALL PENDING REACTOR LICENSING PROCEEDINGS PENDING 
COMPLETION OF REMANDED WASTE CONFIDENCE PROCEEDINGS, CLI-12-16 (2012) 
[hereinafter NRC ORDER].
141 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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the expansion of SNF pools, demanding that the NRC answer 
particular questions that should have been addressed in the 
administrative record under NEPA.142 The court asked the NRC to 
consider whether there was “reasonable assurance” that (1) an off-
site storage solution will be available by the expiration of the plant’s 
operating licenses and (2) if not, the fuel could be stored safely at the 
sites beyond those dates.143 The court also acknowledged that the 
NRC could properly address these waste disposal issues in a generic 
rule because they were “essentially common to all nuclear 
facilities.”144
In response, the NRC published the original WCD in 1984.145
The original WCD included five “Waste Confidence Findings,” 
briefly summarized as follows: the NRC found “reasonable 
assurance” that (1) safe disposal of HLW and SNF in a mined 
geologic repository is technically feasible; (2) one or more geologic 
repositories will be available by 2007 to 2009; (3) waste will be 
managed safely until a repository is available; (4) if necessary, SNF 
can be stored safely at nuclear plants at least thirty years beyond the 
licensed life of each plant; and (5) safe, independent storage will be 
made available when needed.146 In 1990, the NRC amended Finding 
2 to predict the creation of a permanent geologic repository by 
2025.147 The NRC relied on the WCD as a generic rule to comply 
with NEPA in subsequent license issuances and renewals. 
Over the years, the NRC has periodically reviewed the WCD 
to address the changing status of the DOE geologic repository 
program.  In 2008, the NRC proposed substantial revisions to the 
WCD.  After receiving public comments, the NRC reaffirmed three 
of its findings and amended two of its findings in 2010.148 The NRC 
amended Finding 2 to state that a permanent repository will become 
142 Id. at 417.
143 Id. at 418.
144 Id. at 417. 
145 Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658 (Aug. 31, 1984).
146 Id. at 34,659–60.
147 Waste Confidence Decision Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,474, 38,505 
(Sept. 18, 1990).
148 Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,037 (Dec. 23, 
2010) [hereinafter WCD Update].
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available “when necessary” rather than by a specific year.149 The 
NRC arrived at this conclusion after considering the “the political 
and technical obstacles” in creating a permanent repository, and 
determined that one will be available “when the safety of temporary 
on-site storage can no longer be assured.”150
The NRC also amended Finding 4, known as the “Temporary 
Storage Rule” (TSR).151 The original TSR stated that SNF could be 
stored safely on-site for thirty years beyond the licensed life of the 
nuclear power plant, including the license renewal period.152 The 
updated version of Finding 4 now states that SNF can be safely 
stored on-site for sixty years beyond the licensed life of the plant, 
including the license renewal period.153 In developing this finding, 
the NRC assessed the environmental risks of temporary storage, 
specifically the risk of leakage from containment pools and the risk 
of fire caused by SNF exposure to air.154 With regard to potential 
leaks, the NRC studied previous leaks at facilities and found that the 
near-term health effects were negligible.155 The NRC predicted a 
further reduction in leaks as a result of recent regulations, and 
concluded that leaks do not pose a threat of a significant 
environmental impact.156 Similarly, the NRC determined that the 
likelihood of pool fires was low enough to present no threat of a 
significant environmental impact.157
B.  New York v. NRC Renders Waste Confidence Decision Invalid
On June 8, 2012, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated 
the NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision for lacking a sufficient 
environmental evaluation under NEPA in New York v. Nuclear 
149 Id.
150 New York v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 475 (D.C. Cir. 
2012).
151 WCD Update, supra note 148, at 81,038. 
152 Id.
153 Id. at 81,037.  The sixty-year period applies to various types of 
temporary storage—“a combination of storage in its spent fuel storage basin and 
either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.”  Id.
154 New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 475. 
155 Id. at 481.
156 WCD Update, supra note 148, at 81,069–71. 
157 New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 475.
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Regulatory Commission.158 The states of New York, New Jersey, 
Vermont, and Connecticut, along with an Indian community and 
multiple environmental groups, petitioned for judicial review of the 
2010 amendments to the WCD relating to permanent disposal and 
temporary storage of nuclear waste.159 The judgment was founded 
on two main holdings.  First, the court held that the WCD constitutes 
a “major federal action” under NEPA, requiring either an EIS or a 
FONSI.160 Second, the court held that the NRC’s evaluation of risks 
was a “deficient” environmental assessment under NEPA.161
The court first assessed whether the WCD itself constituted a 
“major federal action” implicating NEPA.  The NRC contended that 
the WCD was simply a response to the court’s mandate in Minnesota 
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to provide general public 
assurance that permanent disposal of nuclear waste will be 
accomplished safely in the future.162 The NRC maintained that the 
WCD is not a major federal action because the WCD itself “does not 
authorize the licensing of any nuclear reactor or storage facility,” but 
rather, the agency conducts a site-specific EIS for each individual 
licensing action.163 In rejecting this argument, the court explained 
that it failed to align with controlling precedent.164 Under Calvert 
Cliffs, NEPA requires environmental evaluation by an agency “at 
every important stage in the decision-making process.”165 While the 
licensure of a nuclear power plant clearly falls within this category, 
“major federal actions” also include actions with “indirect effects, 
which . . . are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still 
reasonably foreseeable.”166 The court reasoned that the WCD, a 
generic rulemaking with preclusive effect in all future licensing 
decisions, is a “pre-determined ‘stage’” of each and every licensing 
decision.167 Even though site-specific factors can be contested with 
158 Id. at 483. 
159 Id. at 473. 
160 Id. at 476. 
161 Id. at 473.
162 Id. at 476.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic 
Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
167 New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 476.
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each license, the overall conclusions of the WCD apply as fact in 
every licensing decision.  The court expounded, “It is not only 
reasonably foreseeable but eminently clear that the WCD will be 
used to enable licensing decisions based on its findings.”168
Therefore, based on the far-reaching and significant effects of the 
WCD, the court concluded that the WCD constituted a “major federal 
action” that activated the procedural requirements of NEPA.169
None of the parties contested that the WCD lacked an EIS as 
outlined under NEPA. An agency has discretion whether to prepare 
an EIS or an EA.  The court explained that an EIS is not required 
under NEPA so long as “the agency conducts an EA and issues a 
FONSI sufficiently explaining why the proposed action will not have 
a significant environmental impact.”170 An agency’s decision not to 
prepare an EIS is viewed with considerable deference, and may only 
be overturned if it is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion 
. . . .”171 The NRC argued that the WCD, viewed in light of NEPA 
obligations, constituted an EA that ultimately had a finding of no 
significant environmental impact.172 The court assessed this 
argument with respect to both of the challenged Findings—Finding 2 
and Finding 4. 
Finding 2 in the WCD Update states that a permanent 
repository for SNF will be made available “when necessary.”173 The 
petitioners argued that the WCD Update was inadequate for three 
reasons: first, the NRC did not give proper weight to the social and 
political barriers that have historically hindered the creation of a 
repository; second, the NRC failed “to define the term ‘necessary’ in 
any meaningful way”; and third, the NRC did not examine “the 
effects of a failure to establish a repository in time.”174 The NRC 
responded that it “candidly acknowledged” the social and political 
challenges, but the agency itself cannot overcome those 
challenges.175 Further, the NRC argued that NEPA does not require 
168 Id. at 477.
169 Id. at 476.
170 Id. at 477.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 476.
173 Id. at 478. 
174 Id. at 477.
175 Id. at 478.
                                                        
750 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
date-specific predictions, and the agency has used the “when 
necessary” formulation as far back as 1977.176
Ultimately, the court held that the NRC’s WCD Update did 
not produce a sufficient FONSI because it did not assess the 
environmental effects of failing to establish a repository.177 Under 
NEPA, an agency must examine “both the probabilities of potentially 
harmful events and the consequences if those events come to 
pass.”178 The NRC dismissed the possibility of a failure to secure a 
geologic repository because it did not discuss the risks or the 
consequences of such a scenario.  The court determined that all 
aspects of the WCD “presumes the existence of a geologic 
repository.”179 An agency may issue a FONSI, however, if the 
probability of occurrence is “so low as to be ‘remote and 
speculative.’”180 The court reasoned that the NRC rulemaking did 
not meet this standard, because “reasonable assurance” that 
permanent storage will become available someday is a “far cry” from 
finding that the likelihood of failure to secure permanent storage is 
“remote and speculative.”181 Relying on the political history of the 
federal repository program, the failure to secure permanent storage 
was no “remote or speculative” idea to the court:
Due to the government’s failure to establish a final 
resting place for spent fuel, SNF is currently stored on 
site at nuclear plants.  This type of storage, 
optimistically labeled “temporary storage,” has been 
used for decades longer than originally anticipated. . . 
.  The lack of progress on a permanent repository has 
caused considerable uncertainty regarding the 
environmental effects of temporary SNF storage and 
176 Id.
177 Id. 
178 Id. (emphasis added). 
179 Id. at 479.
180 Id. at 478.  Computation of environmental risks under NEPA is not 
uniformly defined, and can result in different and arguable conclusions.  The court 
offered a vague formula for computing risk under NEPA: “The concept of overall 
risk incorporates the significance of possible adverse consequences discounted by 
the improbability of their occurrence.”  Id. at 479 (quoting City of N.Y. v. Dep't of 
Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 738 (2d Cir.1983)).
181 Id. at 479.
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the reasonableness of continuing to license and 
relicense nuclear reactors . . . . 
. . . .
. . . The Commission apparently has no long-term plan 
other than hoping for a geologic repository. If the 
government continues to fail in its quest to establish 
one, then SNF will seemingly be stored on site at 
nuclear plants on a permanent basis. The Commission 
can and must assess the potential environmental 
effects of such a failure.182
Concluding that the NRC ignored the risks and consequences 
of a failure to secure permanent storage, the Court held that the NRC 
did not conduct a sufficient EA under NEPA with respect to the 
WCD Update.183
Finding 4, or the TSR, stated that SNF can be stored safely 
on-site for sixty years beyond the licensed life of the plant, instead of 
thirty years.  The NRC maintained that this increase in time produced 
no significant environmental impact,184 and petitioners objected on 
two grounds.  First, petitioners argued that a generic rulemaking was 
not appropriate here because the risks of temporary storage largely 
depend on site-specific factors, thus calling for individual 
assessments.185 Second, petitioners argued that even if a generic rule 
were satisfactory, this generic rule was insufficient because the 
agency did not thoroughly evaluate the risks of future SNF pool leaks 
and fires.186 The NRC countered that it had examined previous SNF 
pool leaks and the damage from past leaks “have been shown to be 
quite minimal.”187 The NRC also argued that it has engaged in 
“exhaustive consideration” of the risk of pool fires and found such an 
event to be “extremely unlikely,” or “so low that the consequences 
182 Id. at 474, 479. 
183 Id. at 483.
184 Id. at 476.
185 Id. at 479.  These site-specific factors include “pool configuration, leak 
detection systems, the nature of SNF stored in the pool, and the location of the pool 
within the plant.”  Id.
186 Id. at 479–80. 
187 Id. at 480.
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could not possibly overcome the low probability.”188 A site-by-site 
approach was not necessary, the NRC claimed, because the generic
rule was predicated on studies that addressed plant-to-plant 
variations.  According to the NRC, even the “most dangerous 
combinations of site-specific factors” resulted in an extremely low 
risk of fire.189
Considering these arguments, the court endorsed the use of a 
generic rulemaking for the temporary storage issue.  A 
comprehensive rule addressing “on-site risks that are essentially 
common to all plants” is appropriate and well established under 
NEPA.190 Although the court upheld the concept of a generic
rulemaking to address temporary storage, it rejected the actual rule 
and its underlying environmental assessment.191 Acknowledging that 
Baltimore Gas called for the highest level of deference toward 
agency decisions, the court stated that the NRC “failed to conduct a 
thorough enough analysis here to merit our deference.”192 The court 
deemed the NRC’s evaluation of pool leaks to be seriously flawed 
because the agency examined the harm caused by past leaks only, 
which reveals little about the potential of future leaks.193 The court 
explained that “a proper analysis of the risks would necessarily look 
forward” in order to study the impact of thirty additional years of 
SNF storage.194 The court also pointed out that the NRC failed to 
assess any environmental impacts other than near-term health 
effects.195 Therefore, the court found that the NRC’s environmental 
analysis of pool leaks was insufficient.196
With respect to SNF pool fires, the court faulted the NRC for 
failing to discuss the consequences of a potential fire.197 The court 
recognized that the agency conducted a thorough evaluation of the 
risks of fire and accepted its conclusion that the risks were extremely 
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.  Also, interested parties have an opportunity to raise site-specific 
differences at the time of an individual plant’s licensing.  Id.
191 Id. at 480–81. 
192 Id. at 481.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 482.
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low.198 However, NEPA still requires the agency to examine both 
the risks and the consequences of a fire if it were to occur.199 The 
court determined that the NRC “did not undertake to examine the 
consequences of pool fires at all,” so the NRC did not produce a 
sufficient EA under NEPA.200
In sum, the court vacated the WCD Update because it lacked 
a thorough environmental analysis as required by NEPA.  Yet the 
crucial aspect of this case is not so much the procedural requirements 
of NEPA, but rather what it says about permanent storage of nuclear 
waste.  The language throughout the opinion exhibits a strong 
skepticism toward the entire federal repository program,201 perhaps 
reflecting the public perception as well.  It would appear, if only at a 
superficial level, that the NRC is simply extending the amount of 
time that SNF can be stored on-site to cope with the unmet deadlines 
of a failing repository program.  The effect of the WCD Updates 
cannot be understated—it establishes a total reliance on temporary 
storage, possibly for the remainder of our lives, under the assumption 
that permanent storage will be attained “when necessary.”  Even 
affording such deference to the NRC, the WCD Updates would seem 
at least suspect or doubtful.  An attentive American public, including 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, needs a more comprehensive and 
convincing assessment of the current nuclear waste disposal program. 
C.  NRC Responds to New York v. NRC by Implementing Licensing 
Freeze
While New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was 
“another in the growing line of cases”202 relating to the government’s 
failure to establish a permanent nuclear waste repository, it diverged 
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 The Court expressed doubt for the program based on the futility of past 
combined efforts, rather than the fault of any particular agency.  “Yet despite years 
of blue ribbon commissions, congressional hearings, agency reports, and site 
investigations, the United States has not yet developed a permanent solution.”  Id.
at 474.  “[W]e share petitioners’ considerable skepticism as to whether a permanent 
facility can be built given the societal and political barriers to selecting a site . . . .”  
Id. at 478. 
202 Id. at 473. 
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from the previous succession of cases in its remarkable result.  In 
August 2012, the NRC issued a Memorandum and Order in which it 
announced that the agency will not issue final licenses “until the 
court’s remand is appropriately addressed.”203 The NRC explained 
that the indefinite freeze extended to final license approval only, and 
all licensing reviews and other proceedings will carry on as usual.204
Acknowledging the adverse ruling in New York v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, the agency stated that it has not determined 
a course of action.205 It is currently “considering all available options 
for resolving the waste confidence issue, which could include generic 
or site-specific NRC actions, or some combination of both.”206 The 
NRC is accepting public comments for any generic determination it 
makes on remand, whether it be a new rulemaking, policy statement, 
EA, or EIS.207
It is clear that the NRC must revise its environmental analysis 
to provide a sounder and more convincing rulemaking regarding the 
waste confidence issue.  Although the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
invalidated the agency’s rule, it acknowledged that the NRC is in a 
difficult position.208 New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
exposed the dilemma that the NRC and the entire nuclear sector is 
203 NRC ORDER, supra note 140, at 4.
204 Id.  Does this even change anything?  Some nuclear energy specialists 
assert that the licensing freeze will have a “minimal impact” on the industry.  See
James Conca, Nuclear Waste Confidence—NRC Ruling No Big Deal, FORBES
(Aug. 12, 2012, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/08/11/nuclear-waste-confidence-
nrc-ruling-no-big-deal.  The nuclear sector has always been governed by a slow 
moving regulatory system, and they believe that the NRC will resolve the problem 
and lift the freeze “before any of the critical licensing deadlines pass.”  Id.  The 
majority of nuclear reactors were relicensed in the last ten years and are relatively 
protected against the effects of this measure.  Id. Former NRC Commissioner Peter 
Bradford stated that “the reactors awaiting construction licenses weren’t going to 
be built anytime soon even without the court decision or today’s NRC action.”  
U.S. Freezes All Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Decisions, ENVIRONMENT NEWS 
SERVICE (Aug. 7, 2012, 4:53 PM), http://ens-newswire.com/2012/08/07/u-s-
freezes-all-nuclear-power-plant-licensing-decisions/.
205 NRC ORDER, supra note 140, at 4. 
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 483 (“We recognize that the Commission is in a difficult position 
given the political problems concerning the storage of spent nuclear fuel.”). 
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facing.  For over twenty years, the NRC has derived its authority to 
license nuclear operations from the theory that the generated waste 
will someday be put to rest in a geologic repository.  The future of 
nuclear energy demands the creation of a permanent repository.  Yet 
there is a disconnect between the NRC, whose regulatory authority 
extends to commercial reactors and plants, and the DOE, the agency 
authorized to construct a federal repository for this commercial 
waste. 
The NRC maintains that a geologic repository will be 
achieved through “open and transparent” decision-making in the 
future.209 It points to the NWPA, and the federal government’s 
continual mandate to construct a repository and uphold its obligations 
to the nuclear energy sector.210 The question is whether the NRC is 
beholden to the long-term federal plan under the NWPA.  As the 
agency at the forefront of nuclear licensing battles, the NRC is under 
the most direct pressure to come to terms with the state of the federal 
repository program.  Must the NRC continue to follow the protocol 
of the NWPA, or could the agency take a distinctive approach to safe 
nuclear waste disposal?  The answer depends partly on the agency’s 
authority, but is largely a matter of strategy for the NRC. 
V. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES FOR THE NRC TO COMPLY WITH NEPA
The NRC may choose to uphold the precept in the WCD that 
a geologic repository will be achieved, and the nation’s SNF 
inventory will safely remain at the reactor sites until then.  The NRC 
could continue down this path and still satisfy the procedural 
requirements of NEPA so long as all of the risks and consequences 
are accounted for in its environmental impact statement.211 However, 
this strategy does not serve the best interests of the nuclear energy 
sector, and it does nothing for waste confidence.  Instead, the NRC 
must adopt the perspective that a new strategy is needed.  The NRC 
can acknowledge where the political system has failed and 
recommend the safest options in light of these political inadequacies.
The DOE now calls for a complete overhaul of the federal waste 
209 New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 477.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 482.
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management program, naming consolidated storage systems as an 
interim solution for SNF.212 Indeed, the NRC should incorporate a 
consolidated storage plan into the next WCD.
A.  Acknowledge the Failure of Yucca Mountain & the Need for a 
New Strategy
At the request of the President, the Secretary of Energy 
formed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future 
(BRC) to conduct a massive review of previous policies and 
recommend a new strategy for “managing the back end of the nuclear 
fuel cycle.”213 This broad language in the preamble (as opposed to a 
narrow focus on a federal repository) reflects a more progressive 
approach to the SNF problem than that of past years.  First, the BRC 
confirmed that the U.S. nuclear waste management program is at an 
impasse.214 It faulted federal policy tracing back to the 1987 
amendments to the NWPA, which “tied the entire U.S. high-level 
waste management program to the fate of the Yucca Mountain site . . 
. only to come to a point where continuing to rely on the same 
approach seems destined to bring further controversy, litigation, and 
protracted delay.”215 The BRC issued an eight-point plan to revive 
212 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 32–45. 
213 See id. at iii.  Between March 2010 and January 2012, the BRC and its 
subcommittees convened over two dozen times to hear expert and stakeholder 
testimony, to visit nuclear waste management facilities, and to hold public 
meetings to gather feedback on its draft reports.  Id.
214 Id. at vi.
215 Id.  The BRC was not chartered to address and did not issue a 
conclusion on the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a repository site. The report 
stated: 
The Obama Administration’s decision to halt work on a 
repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada is but the latest 
indicator of a policy that has been troubled for decades and has 
now all but completely broken down . . . .
. . . [W]e focused on developing a sound strategy for future 
storage and disposal facilities and operations that we believe can 
and should be implemented regardless of what happens with 
Yucca Mountain.
Id. at vi–viii.
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the nuclear waste management program, mostly comprised of 
legislative solutions.216 Among these proposals was an amendment 
to the NWPA to establish a consent-based siting process modeled 
after successfully implemented programs in Finland and Sweden.217
The BRC also proposed establishing a new, government-chartered 
corporation, independent from the DOE, that would solely focus on 
carrying out the waste management program.218 The BRC proposed 
changes to the federal budget rules to enable reliable access to the 
Nuclear Waste Fund by separating it from the annual appropriations 
process.219
In total, the BRC Report portends drastic changes in U.S. 
nuclear energy policy.  Many of these recommendations could only 
materialize within the legislative branch, and the NRC would have no 
control over the implementation of these measures.220 Of course, 
NEPA does not require the NRC to make political predictions.  Yet if 
216 Id. at viii.
217 See id. at 48–55.
218 See id. at 60–69.  Other nuclear policy experts have urged that “the 
DOE should be relieved of the responsibility” of commercial nuclear waste 
management, and instead focus solely on the waste generated by nuclear weapons 
and naval reactor programs.  See Ewing & von Hippel, supra note 62, at 152.  
Rather than shifting management to a new federal government entity, they argue 
for state governments to pursue consolidated storage options within their regions.  
Id.
219 See BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 70–79.  The other points in the plan 
included: 
4. Prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal 
facilities.
5. Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage 
facilities.
6. Prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale transport 
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to consolidated storage 
and disposal facilities when such facilities become available.
7. Support for continued U.S. innovation in nuclear energy 
technology and for workforce development.
8. Active U.S. leadership in international efforts to address 
safety, waste-management, non-proliferation and security 
concerns.
Id. at vii (footnote omitted). 
220 Id.
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an agency’s rulemaking depends on the occurrence of a future 
political action, the agency must have some rational basis to rely on 
that political outcome.  This explains why the NRC’s decisions have 
historically aligned with the NWPA’s program and timeline.  
However, NEPA is concerned with the realistic environmental 
outcomes of a major federal action.  As New York v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission clearly demonstrated, NEPA requires the 
agency to disclose the probabilities of potentially harmful events and 
the consequences “if those events come to pass.”221 For the purposes 
of NEPA, the NRC cannot presume the creation of a federal 
repository under the NWPA.222 Due to the prolonged delay in the 
federal repository program, the NRC should formulate and assess a 
consolidated storage plan as an interim waste confidence solution to 
satisfy NEPA’s procedural directives.  
B.  Consolidated Storage: An Interim Solution
Although the BRC Report highlighted many political defects 
in the nuclear waste management program, the WCD addresses 
temporary on-site storage and geologic repository disposal.  By 
concentrating exclusively on these two stages, the U.S. nuclear waste 
management program is conspicuously lacking what a recent 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study described as “a 
major component of nuclear fuel cycle policy.”223 This key 
component is long-term interim storage, or “consolidated storage.”  
221 New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 478 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012).
222 Of course, official legislative approval in the form of an Act adds 
credence to the agency’s prediction.  Likewise, federal appropriations to carry out 
the plan lend further support.  But the procedural directives of NEPA remain the 
same. 
223 PHIL SHARP ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE 
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 5 (2011), available at
http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/The_Nuclear_Fuel_Cycle-all.pdf.  Waste 
management programs in other countries, such as France and Sweden, have built 
consolidated storage facilities to keep SNF for forty to sixty years to reduce 
radioactivity and heat before disposal.  Id.  The United States lacks consolidated 
storage as a formal phase, and “[t]he failure to include long term storage as part of 
the spent fuel management has had major impacts on the design of the proposed 
Yucca Mountain Repository (YMR).”  Id.
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Instead of densely packing SNF into on-site containment pools that 
were never designed to be long-term storage facilities,224 nuclear 
policy experts are recommending that the U.S. transition toward 
centralized SNF storage facilities.225 Consolidated storage would not
replace the need for a geologic repository.  Managed storage is 
believed to be safe for a century, but eventually the SNF storage 
casks degrade due to radioactivity, heat load, and external 
conditions.226 Consolidated storage would serve as an integral part of 
a long-term nuclear fuel cycle plan that includes a permanent 
repository as a final destination.227 Ultimately, long-term storage 
“provides time” to achieve proper development of one or more 
repositories while offering certain safety advantages.228
“Stranded” SNF, residing at reactor sites that have been shut 
down, provide the strongest case for consolidated storage.229 The 
MIT study recommended that SNF “should be removed as soon as 
possible from decommissioned reactor sites to centralized storage 
facilities or operating reactor facilities.”230 Although the quantity of 
stranded SNF is small (roughly equal to one year’s worth of U.S. 
production), the costs to store at decommissioned sites are 
disproportionately high.231 This relatively small quantity of SNF 
must be monitored at the old reactor site, costing between 4.5 and 8 
million dollars per year.232 The BRC Report found that the “savings 
achievable by consolidating stranded spent fuel at a centralized 
224 “[I]t is clear that today’s institutional arrangements and storage 
technologies were not designed for the lengthy storage timescales that now appear 
inevitable for at least some of the nation’s spent fuel inventory.”  BRC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 34. 
225 Echoing the findings of the 2010 MIT interdisciplinary study, the BRC 
Report also recommended a transition to consolidated storage as one of the points 
in its eight-point plan.  Id. at vii. 
226 SHARP ET AL., supra note 223, at 6. 
227 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at xii.
228 SHARP ET AL., supra note 223, at 5. 
229 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at xii.
230 SHARP ET AL., supra note 223, at 5.
231 Id. At active reactor sites, SNF storage is a relatively low burden 
because they already have the necessary security and “only an incremental effort is 
required” to cover the independent storage installation under their operating 
licenses.  BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
232 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
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facility would be enough to pay for that facility.”233 Apart from cost, 
there are some long-term safety issues associated with storage at 
decommissioned sites.  Most decommissioned sites now lack the 
ability to extract the storage casks for inspection, and over time, 
degradation of the casks may impair their transportation to other 
locations.234 Consolidated storage facilities could be developed to 
actively manage and inspect the casks.235 Similarly, future safety and 
security regulations can be implemented more cost-effectively at a 
centralized facility.236
Consolidated storage does more than simply alleviate the 
burden on decommissioned sites; it offers much-needed flexibility for 
the entire waste management program.237 Even though the current 
storage arrangements have not been deemed unsafe, reactor sites 
would at least have the option of lowering their SNF inventory and 
reducing the heat loads of their reactor pools.238 In light of the events 
at Fukushima,239 it is clear that unforeseen situations can arise and 
demand immediate responses.  The BRC report conceded that the 
United States “lacks any capability to receive spent fuel in 
emergency situations.”240 In an accident scenario, SNF could be 
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. 
236 Id.
237 Id. at 32.
238 Id. at 38.
239 In March 2011, an earthquake and fifteen-meter tsunami caused the 
Fukushima I nuclear power plant to experience a “melt-down”; literally, the nuclear 
reactors severely overheated and melted.  WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, Fukushima 
Accident 2011, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf69.html (last visited Mar. 10, 
2013).  The disaster was primarily caused by the flooding of the emergency 
generators, which cut off the power supply and inhibited the cooling and water 
circulation processes of the plant.  Id. High radioactive releases into the air in the 
first few days prompted the evacuation of 100,000 people from the area.  Id.  
Several employees of the plant were treated for physical injuries, but fortunately, 
no known deaths or cases of radiation sickness resulted from the Fukushima 
accident.  Id.
240 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 38.  Existing contracts with nuclear 
utilities companies have created a “queue” for SNF to be accepted by the federal 
government.  Id. at 42.  The DOE is seeking to revise the queue’s current order.  
See id. at 38.  Theoretically, this queue could be quickly rearranged in an 
emergency situation, but this would only be relevant if there were a facility or 
repository to accept SNF.  Id.
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discharged and moved off-site at a moment’s notice to a consolidated 
storage facility with wet storage space.241 Consolidated storage also 
offers more secure placement of nuclear waste than under the present 
system.  Unlike nuclear reactors, which are located near large sources 
of water, consolidated storage sites would be located in areas of the 
country with less severe weather patterns.242 Consolidated storage 
sites would be placed in isolated areas of the U.S. where the risk of 
“broad-based population exposures in the event of a disaster are 
lower, and where local conditions are conducive to effectively 
monitoring and managing security risks.”243
From a practical standpoint, the nuclear regulatory structure is 
able to accommodate a consolidated storage plan.  Currently, nuclear 
power plants are classified into four NRC-created regions: West, 
Midwest, Southeast, and Northeast.244 This could also serve as the 
regional division for future interim storage sites.  Nuclear waste-
producing states should have the incentive to pursue, or at least 
cooperate with, the installment of consolidated storage sites to accept 
SNF within their regions.245 Also, the federal government will begin 
meeting its legal obligations under the NWPA by moving SNF into 
consolidated storage.246 The removal of SNF from reactor sites is a 
huge step that would relieve taxpayers of further damage awards
resulting from the DOE’s failure to perform under its existing 
contracts.247
In terms of NEPA compliance, the NRC can address the 
major faults of its vacated WCD by embracing a consolidated storage 
plan.  First, a long-term consolidated storage system lessens the 
gravity of a failure to secure permanent storage under Finding 2.  If 
the NRC formulates a consolidated storage system designed to safely 
store SNF for at least a century, the necessity of a permanent 
repository will be lessened and/or extended.  Second, the agency’s 
risk-analysis of temporary storage would be bolstered by 
incorporating a comprehensive consolidated storage plan under 
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Ewing & von Hippel, supra note 62, at 152. 
245 See id.
246 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
247 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 37. 
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Finding 4.  Centralized storage facilities have the ability to accept 
degrading casks of SNF that pose the highest danger based on factors 
that the NRC determines, such as the age of the SNF, location at a 
decommissioned site, and other risk indicators.248 A generic 
rulemaking that includes a sixty-year timeline for temporary storage 
would be more reasonable if consolidated long-term storage facilities 
existed. 
The main legal obstacle that prevents immediate development 
of consolidated storage facilities is the 1987 Amendment to the 
NWPA, which authorizes the development of one geologic repository 
and precludes the development of monitored retrievable storage 
(MRS) sites.249 However, the federal government may still site, 
design, and even obtain construction authorization for MRS (i.e., 
consolidated storage) facilities.250 For a consolidated storage facility 
to fully materialize, though, Congress would have to amend the 
NWPA to allow construction of a storage facility independent of the 
status of a repository.251 Because the SNF on hand already exceeds 
the 70,000 metric tons of storage capacity authorized by the NWPA, 
and for other reasons, the NWPA is unarguably outdated.  An 
amendment to the NWPA is foreseeable if the nuclear waste issue 
makes its way onto the political agenda.
What does this mean for the NRC?  If the agency wishes to 
pursue consolidated storage as part of its waste confidence decision, 
it could wait until Congress amends the NWPA to attain a higher 
level of certainty.  On the other hand, the NRC could set the course 
for political change by calling for consolidated storage in a new 
WCD Update.  As an independent agency, especially one with such 
technical expertise, the NRC should preemptively issue its own 
conclusion on this matter.  To do so, the agency will need to research 
the safety and feasibility of consolidated storage management of SNF 
for at least a century, as well as the transportation-related issues of 
cask degradation over extended storage times.  The NRC has already 
made significant headway in researching and promulgating 
248 See BRC Report, supra note 3, at xii.
249 See supra Part II.A–B. 
250 BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 37.  The BRC posited that “further 
legislative action would not be required . . . potentially . . . until the construction 
phase.” Id.
251 Id.
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regulations for independent spent fuel storage installations in the 
form of dry cask and dry vault storage technologies.252 Using this 
knowledge, the NRC should incorporate a formal consolidated 
storage phase into the nuclear fuel cycle in the revised WCD. 
C.  Reprocessing: Keeping Options Open for the Future
Another alternative exists in the nuclear fuel cycle, although it 
has not been pursued in the United States.  “Reprocessing” is the 
treatment of spent nuclear fuel to allow it to be used again in the 
nuclear process.253 Commercial reprocessing facilities abroad 
currently use the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) method, 
in which SNF is dissolved and chemically separated to retrieve 
uranium and plutonium.254 The preserved plutonium is used again in 
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and inserted back into the reactor to 
generate nuclear energy.255 Reprocessing is able to recover ninety-
six percent of SNF for new fuel, with four percent remaining as high-
level waste.256 The remaining radioactive material would still need 
to be isolated; thus, reprocessing does not eliminate the need for a 
252 Id.
253 See Clinton Bastin, We Need to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Fuel, and 
Can Do It Safely, at Reasonable Cost, 21ST CENTURY SCI. & TECH. 10 (2008), 
available at
http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles%202008/Summer_2008/Reproces
sing.pdf (arguing that the concept of “nuclear waste” is a fiction, and that given 
advanced reprocessing technologies, nuclear energy is a renewable resource).
254 Szabo, supra note 6, at 238.  “Regular” SNF contains plutonium and 
uranium mixed with other highly radioactive elements.  The PUREX method yields 
pure plutonium, which is why reprocessing is considered to pose a heightened 
security risk of theft for nuclear weapons proliferation.  Costs of Reprocessing 
Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel: CBO Testimony Before the U.S. 
Senate Subcomm. on Energy and Nat. Resources, 110th Cong. 4. (2007) (statement 
of CBO Director Peter Orzsag) [hereinafter CBO Testimony].  Further research is 
needed to strengthen security against proliferation.  See infra notes 258–259.
255 WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf69.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013)
[hereinafter Processing of Used Fuel].
256 Bastin, supra note 253, at 12.  Although there is some question as to 
whether the remaining four percent should even be classified as “waste.”  Id. 
Bastin argues that the remaining radioactive material can be separated to yield 
valuable isotopes that the U.S. currently imports for medical testing and treatment.  
Id.
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permanent repository.  However, the total amount of high-level waste 
is dramatically reduced to about one-fifth of its original volume.257
Theoretically, reprocessing can “extend[] the world’s uranium 
resources almost indefinitely.”258 While this is useful for energy 
purposes, reprocessing also breaks plutonium into nonfissionable, 
shorter-lived isotopes with less explosive properties than “regular” 
SNF that has not been reprocessed.259 Over time, reprocessing 
significantly reduces both the volume and the radiotoxicity of nuclear 
waste.260
Despite these advantages, the United States has not embraced 
commercial reprocessing because the technology has yet to become 
257 Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 255.
258 Richard Rhodes and Denis Beller, The Need for Nuclear Power, 79 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 41 (2000).  Some may wonder, why was reprocessing not 
considered previously?  Reprocessing is not cutting-edge research; it was first 
developed during the Manhattan Project while constructing the atomic bomb.  See
Szabo, supra note 6, at 235–37.  At the time, reprocessing was deemed necessary 
because uranium was thought to be very scarce.  ANTHONY ANDREWS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS 22542, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development
1 (2008).  During the Cold War, though, reprocessing began to take on a 
threatening connotation because other countries were using this technology for the 
sole purpose of developing nuclear weapons.  Id. at 3.  In 1976, President Gerald 
Ford issued a policy statement that condemned reprocessing, fearing that it would 
increase the risk of nuclear proliferation.  Id. The next year, President Carter 
suspended all “commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium” in the United 
States in an effort to curb nuclear escalation.  Id. This ban was later lifted under 
President Reagan, but most U.S. facilities never pursued reprocessing technology.  
Id. at 5.  Only in recent years has reprocessing technology been suggested in terms 
of safer, cleaner, and possibly more efficient energy production. 
259 Rhodes & Beller, supra note 258, at 41.  Various European countries 
have been researching other advanced reprocessing methods that reduce the risk of 
proliferation, including the UREX method and pyroprocessing.  See Processing of 
Used Fuel, supra note 255.  In 2006, the U.S. government created the Global 
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to collaborate with other countries on 
“proliferation-resistant recycling technologies in order to produce more energy, 
reduce waste and minimise proliferation concerns.”  Id. The U.S. domestic 
component of this program was cancelled in 2009. See International Framework 
for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (July 2012), 
http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf117_international_framework_nuclear_energy_cooperation.htm
l.
260 Michael Valenti, Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel a la Francaise, 117 
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 76–80 (1995).
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cost-effective.261 The cost-benefit analysis of reprocessing versus 
disposal tends to turn on the price of uranium, and thus far, uranium 
has been cheap enough to warrant disposal of SNF rather than 
retrieving the uranium through reprocessing.262 However, the United 
States imports nearly all of its uranium from foreign countries, and 
the average spot price has been relatively unstable.263 Crucially, the 
United States lacks special facilities that could accommodate 
commercial reprocessing technology.264 Also, some form of long-
term storage is necessary to house recycled SNF.265 For these 
reasons, commercial reprocessing in the United States is not 
economically feasible now or in the near future.266
The prohibitive costs present in the commercial sector do not 
signal that reprocessing should be abandoned as a scientific pursuit.  
Reprocessing is the future of nuclear energy.267 Currently, France, 
the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, and India have their own 
reprocessing facilities.268 Several other European countries send 
their SNF to be reprocessed at La Hague, France—the world’s largest 
reprocessing facility.269 Most of these countries have chosen to 
reprocess spent fuel for reasons other than economic efficiency.270
261 See CBO Testimony, supra note 254, at 6–11. 
262 A Harvard University study from 2003 concluded that reprocessing 
“will be more expensive than direct disposal of spent fuel until the uranium price 
reaches over $360 per kilogram of uranium.”  Matthew Bunn et al., The Economics 
of Reprocessing v. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, PROJECT ON MANAGING 
THE ATOM ix (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
December 2003).
263 Uranium Purchased by Owners and Operators of U.S. Civilian 
Nuclear Power Reactors, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/nuclear/umar/summarytable1.html (last visited Mar. 10, 
2013).
264 CBO Testimony, supra note 254, at 6.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 However, it may be a very “distant” future.  For a fuller discussion of 
the prospects of nuclear reprocessing, see Szabo, supra note 6.
268 CBO Testimony, supra note 254, at 5. 
269 Id.
270 Radio Interview with Charles Forsberg, Executive Director of the MIT 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Project, entitled Living on Earth: Should we Recycle Spent 
Nuclear Fuel? (Apr. 2011), available at
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=11-P13-
00013&segmentID=3. 
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Like other major forms of energy, nuclear power relies on discrete 
quantities of certain elements.  Energy resources are finite, and they 
must be treated as such.  The environmental advantages are clear: 
reprocessing preserves essential resources and reduces radioactive 
byproducts of the nuclear fuel cycle by eighty percent.271 Although 
the full economic advantages have yet to be realized, reprocessing 
should someday lower the costs of long-term storage (through waste 
reduction) and front-end uranium mining costs.272
Reprocessing also provides a strong case for a consolidated 
storage system.  Should the United States pursue this technology, it 
will need monitored and retrievable SNF storage systems.273 The 
current system of geologic disposal is designed to prevent future 
human contact and to deny access to these materials.274 Burial of the 
U.S. inventory of SNF, containing stocks of uranium and plutonium, 
is detrimental to potential reprocessing endeavors in the future.  Even 
though the United States has only a limited reprocessing program 
now, it should not foreclose its ability to pursue commercial 
reprocessing later—whether it be within a few decades or the next 
century. 
In the upcoming WCD revisions, the NRC should take 
nuclear reprocessing into consideration.  At this point, it would be 
premature to outright rely on reprocessing technology to have a 
measurable impact on the amount of accumulating SNF.  
Reprocessing is so early in its development, particularly in the United 
States, that it cannot truly provide “reasonable assurance” in terms of 
waste confidence.  However, the potential for reprocessing 
technology is an important factor in formulating a waste management 
plan.  NRC rulemakings must contemplate long-term needs for the 
industry, as well as the protection of forthcoming generations.  A 
safer and more competitive commercial nuclear energy program will 
demand a consolidated storage system and the capability to pursue 
reprocessing technology. 
271 See supra text accompanying note 257.
272 CBO Testimony, supra note 254, at 6.
273 Id.
274 See supra note 14.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Spent nuclear fuel is a problem that will not subside or fade 
out; rather, it will continue to grow at a slow, predictable rate.  
Allowing this material to literally “pile up” on-site at nuclear 
reactors, in the absence of a long-term solution, should be utterly 
unacceptable to the public.  The federal nuclear waste management 
program has endured much criticism for its failure to develop a 
geologic repository, but critics acknowledge that these failures were 
political rather than scientific or technical errors.275 Yet the safe 
storage and disposal of nuclear waste is in everyone’s best interest.  
The federal government must revise the NWPA and resolve the 
funding issues in order for any aspect of the waste management 
program to move forward. 
As New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
demonstrated, the NRC can no longer steadfastly rely on the current 
legislative scheme of the NWPA in its Waste Confidence Decision.  
The NRC is capable and well-prepared to render its own 
recommendation regarding waste management.  Indeed, no other 
agency is as familiar with commercial nuclear plants and the existing 
storage situation.  In light of the doubtful status of a geologic 
repository, the NRC should revise the WCD to incorporate a 
potential consolidated storage system into its environmental analysis 
under NEPA.  By doing so, the NRC offers a safer and practical 
interim solution until a geologic repository is built, and integrates a 
crucial phase in the fuel-cycle system to support a competitive 
nuclear sector. 
275 See G.A.O. 11-229, supra note 44, at 11.
                                                        
